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Abstract
All Australian children are required by law
to attend school, including children with
disabilities and other special needs.
However, there is no legal duty imposed
upon governments to provide children with
special needs with appropriate educational
support. In most Australian states and
territories, there is no avenue for redress if
children with special needs are not provided
with the educational services they require.
This sets Australia apart from other
jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom
and the United States, where mechanisms
are available through which aggrieved
students and parents can seek a remedy.
This article examines whether Australian
education departments could be held liable
in negligence for failing to provide special
education services to children who need
them.
Introduction
A child’s access to education is considered to
be a universal right, extending even to those
with severe disabilities.1 In Australia, it is
compulsory for all children to attend
school.2 Yet, very few states and territories
in Australia have bound themselves to
provide appropriate special education
services to children who need them.3
The vast majority of Australian children
with special needs attend mainstream
schools.4 Indeed, only 11 percent of children
with disabilities attend special schools.5 This
means that mainstream schools accept
enrolments from children with all kinds of
disabilities including intellectual and
learning disabilities, physical disabilities and
sensory disabilities.6 These children may
struggle within mainstream educational
environments if they are not provided with
adequate support, and so may their teachers
and classmates.7
For children with special needs, inadequate
special education services can mean the
difference between having the opportunity
to become an employable adult or not. Not
receiving required support services in the
* Associate Professor, TC Beirne School of Law, University of Queensland. Many thanks to Professor Kit Barker for his
most helpful comments on an early draft. Thanks also to Alice Husband and Kathryn Thomas for their research
assistance.
1 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989, Arts 23, 28, 29; UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities 2006, Art 24. See also A Bradley, ‘Scope for review: The Convention right to education and the Human
Rights Act 1998’ [1999] European Human Rights Law Review 395, at 405.
2 Exemptions include children enrolled in distance education and children registered for home schooling; see Education Act
2004 (ACT), ss 10–10D, 11G–13; Education Act 1990 (NSW), ss 21B–26; Education Act (NT), ss 20, 20A, 20C, 20F;
Education (General Provisions) Act 2006 (Qld), ss 176–179; Education Act 1972 (SA), ss 75, 76, 81A; Education Act
1994 (Tas), ss 4–10; Education and Training Reform Act 1958 (Vic), ss 2.1.1–2.1.3, 2.1.5; School Education Act 1999
(WA), ss 9–11.
3 Note, however, that in 2012, the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) added a right to education to its Human Rights Act
2004 (ACT). Section 27A now provides a right of access to free, school education ‘appropriate to his or her needs’. It
remains to be seen how this section will be interpreted and enforced in a judicial context.
4 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Disability Update: Children with Disabilities (AIHW, 2006), 22.
5 Ibid.
6 As to children with disabilities in schools, see op cit n 4, 18.
7 See generally Senate Committee on Employment, Workplace Relations and Education References Committee, Education
of Students with Disabilities (Commonwealth of Australia, 2002), Chapter 3: ‘Integration and Inclusion’.
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school environment can result in
psychological harm including anxiety,
depression, loss of self-esteem and loss of
self-confidence.8
Educators are aware that many children
with special needs will struggle to learn in
mainstream educational settings, but
ineffective policies and cost pressures often
stand in the way of adequate service
provision.9 There are few avenues for
redress for Australian children and their
parents in these cases.10 Few states and
territories provide children and parents with
formal complaints mechanisms for merits
review. Disability standards have been
created pursuant to the Disability
Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) to guide
schools when making reasonable
adjustments for students with disabilities,11
but often it is not discriminatory attitudes
that cause the student’s legal problem.12
This paper will explore whether a suit in
negligence may be available to Australian
children with special needs in circumstances
where an education department has failed to
provide them with adequate or appropriate
educational services.13 It will be seen that
there are two key obstacles to establishing
an action in negligence in these
circumstances. First, the Australian courts
are generally reluctant to impose a duty of
care on public authorities, particularly in
light of the complexities of funding and
resource allocation. Civil liability legislation
further entrenches this disinclination.
Secondly, the question of damage raises
some difficulties in this context. In
Australian law, it has been recognised that
schools and education departments have a
duty of care to protect children with special
needs from physical injury on school
grounds,14 however in the absence of
identifiable personal injury, establishing
damage is less straightforward. It will be
concluded that, despite these obstacles, a
cause of action in negligence may be still
arguable in some cases.
8 As to the lived experience of children with disabilities in ‘inclusive’ education settings, see for example M Curtin and
G Clarke, ‘Listening to young people with physical disabilities’ experience of education’ (2005) 52(3) International
Journal of Disability, Development and Education 195; G Laws and E Kelly, ‘The attitudes and friendship intentions of
children in United Kingdom mainstream schools towards peers with physical or intellectual disabilities’ (2005) 52(2)
International Journal of Disability, Development and Education 79; EB Frankel, ‘Supporting inclusive care and education
for young children with special needs and their families: An international perspective’ (2004) 80(6) Childhood Education
310; LH Meyer, ‘The impact of inclusion on children’s lives: Multiple outcomes and friendship in particular’ (2001)
48(1) International Journal of Disability, Development and Education 9; RF Schnorr, ‘ “Peter? He comes and goes . . .”
First graders’ perspectives on a part-time mainstream student’ (1990) 15(4) Journal of the Association for the Severely
Handicapped 231.
9 I have written on this elsewhere; see T Walsh, ‘Adjustments, accommodation and inclusion: Children with disabilities in
Australian primary schools’ (2012) 17(2) International Journal of Law and Education 23.
10 T Walsh, ‘Children with special needs and the right to education’ (2012) 18(1) Australian Journal of Human Rights 27.
11 Disability Standards for Education, pursuant to s 131 of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth).
12 See Walsh, op cit n 9.
13 This paper considers a possible cause of action in negligence. It does not address the possibility of a suit for breach of
statutory duty. The main reason for this is that, in Australia, breach of statutory duty is a doctrine in decline. Another
reason is that it would be difficult to argue that the Australian Education Acts create enforceable statutory duties.
Neither does this paper consider the possibility of causes of action that might lie against education departments for
breaches of specific undertakings made in the Education Acts. In New Zealand, there was one successful claim of this
nature, Attorney-General v Daniels [2003] 2 NZLR 742. A provision in New Zealand’s Education Act stated that the
Crown had a duty to provide special education services ‘sufficient to enable the child to receive some sort of worthwhile
education’. The Court of Appeal held that this did not establish a ‘free-standing right’ but that since the proper processes
outlined in the legislation had not been complied with, the decision of the Minister to disestablish special services in
schools was reviewable.
14 An example of a child with special needs bringing an action against a school for negligence is Van Donselaar v Central
Coast Grammar. In that case, a Year 12 student on crutches slipped on wet stairs as he attempted to carry his backpack
and books to class. His claim failed, and his application for special leave to the High Court was refused, mainly because
of the fact that members of staff had offered to assist him but he declined. Since the vigilance of the teachers and the
school in trying to prevent harm was not in dispute, the duty of care was considered to have been discharged. See Van
Donselaar v Central Coast Grammar School Ltd [2004] HCA Trans 274; Van Donselaar v Central Coast Grammar
School Ltd [2003] NSWCA 241.
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Duty to Prevent Physical Injury in
Education Settings
Under Australian law, educators have a duty
of care to protect students from harm15 and
Australian educational authorities have been
held vicariously liable in cases where
students have sustained injuries at school.16
Initially, the British standard of care was
affirmed by the Australian courts, namely,
that teachers owe students a standard of
care comparable to that of a reasonably
careful and prudent parent.17 Two
justifications were made for this. First,
children, by reason of their ‘immature age’,
are in need of protection against themselves
and others. Second, children are beyond the
reach of their primary caregiver during
school hours so someone else must
necessarily assume control and protection of
them.18
However, the Australian High Court later
observed that this formulation was
somewhat ‘unreal’ in the case of a
headmaster who has charge over hundreds
of students.19 The High Court also
considered whether a school’s duty should
actually be considered to go beyond that of
a parent. It was said by one judge:
‘A school should not be equated to a
home. Often hazards exist in a home
which it would be unreasonable to
allow in a school. A better analogy is
with a factory or other undertaking such
as a hospital.’20
Extending the analogy between a hospital
and a school, the court noted that a hospital
has a duty to ensure that reasonable care is
taken; this goes beyond a duty to take
reasonable care.21 It is a duty that cannot be
delegated22 and cannot be discharged merely
by employing proper staff.23 The court
reasoned that a school authority assumes a
duty to the child upon his or her enrolment
in school – a duty which is sustained by the
continued acceptance of the child as a
student there – and accepts liability for
damage caused by a negligent failure to
provide supervision.24 Thus, at common law
in Australia, a teacher’s duty of care has
been held to extend to omissions that result
in injury, as well as positive acts causing
injury.25 And in instances where the duty is
breached, the school authority (generally the
education department) will also be liable for
any damage.26
The Australian courts have recognised that
the extent or scope of the duty will be
influenced by the facts of each individual
case, so that if a child is at greater risk of
injury as a result of his or her age, level of
15 See particularly Commonwealth v Introvigne (1982) 150 CLR 258.
16 See Duncan by her next friend Duncan v Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Archdiocese of Canberra
[1998] ACTSC 109 where the school was held vicariously liable for the actions of a teacher whose safety instructions
were inadequate to prevent a serious injury in a gymnastics class. As to vicarious liability and direct liability in school
negligence matters, see Commonwealth v Introvigne (1982) 150 CLR 258, 269 (Mason J). See also Ramsay v Larsen
(1964) 111 CLR 16; Geyer v Downs (1977) 138 CLR 91; The Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese
of Bathurst v Koffman and Another [1996] NSWSC 346; ACT Schools Authority v Raczkowski [2001] ACTSC 61;
Parkin v ACT Schools Authority [2005] ACTSC 3; Abraham bht Abraham v St Mark’s Orthodox Coptic College and
Others [2006] NSWSC 1107; AMA v Victoria [2012] VCC 1453.
17 Williams v Eady (1893) 10 TLR 41. Affirmed in Australia in Ramsay v Larsen (1964) 111 CLR 16, 27 (Kitto J). The
reasonable parent standard still applies in Canadian school negligence cases; see generally P Babie, CJ Russo and
GM Dickinson, ‘Supervision of students: An exploratory comparative analysis’ (2004) 9 Australian and New Zealand
Journal of Law and Education 41.
18 See particularly Geyer v Downs (1977) 138 CLR 91, 93 (Stephen J); Richards v State of Victoria [1969] VR 136, 138.
19 Geyer v Downs (1977) 138 CLR 91, 102.
20 Commonwealth v Introvigne (1982) 150 CLR 258, 275 (per Murphy J).
21 Ibid, 270 (per Mason J and Gibbs CJ).
22 See Gold v Essex County Council [1942] 2 KB 293, 301.
23 Commonwealth v Introvigne (1982) 150 CLR 258.
24 Ibid, 279. Note, however, the High Court case of Hadba where a majority of the court held that it was not reasonable,
or indeed desirable, to expect children to be observed by teachers every single moment of the time: Roman Catholic
Church v Hadba (2005) 221 CLR 161, at 169.
25 Geyer v Downs (1977) 138 CLR 91; Commonwealth v Introvigne (1982) 150 CLR 258; Shaw v Commonwealth [1992]
NTSC 90.
26 Commonwealth v Introvigne (1982) 150 CLR 258, 279. Note that damage includes both physical injury (for example
Parkin v ACT Schools [2005] ACTSC 3; AMA v State of Victoria [2012] VCC 1453) and psychiatric injury (for example
Oyston v St Patrick’s College [2011] NSWSC 269; Cox v State of NSW [2007] NSWSC 471).
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maturity or intellectual or physical capacity,
the duty will be more expansive.27 This
means that a higher duty of care might be
imposed upon teachers of children with
special needs.28 In Withyman v State of
NSW,29 a (male) student with special needs
alleged that a (female) special needs teacher
entered into a sexual relationship with him.
He sued the teacher, and the department, in
negligence. The District Court found that a
sexual relationship had existed between
them, that the actions of the teacher were
intentional and amounted to sexual
misconduct, particularly in light of the
plaintiff’s special vulnerability on account of
his personality problems. The court
concluded, therefore, that the teacher had
breached the duty of care she owed to the
student.30
Legal Avenues for Redress in
Australian Special Education Cases
Whilst Australian courts have had little
difficulty in finding that a school teacher
owes a duty to take reasonable care of his
or her students to protect them from
personal injury, few attempts have been
made in Australia to argue that teachers
have a duty to exercise their professional
skills in teaching with due care.31 Further,
there have been no reported cases in
Australia in which an education department
has been sued in negligence for failing to
provide special education services to a child
with special needs.
Each Australian state and territory has its
own Education Act. Most of the Education
Acts in Australia provide no remedy for
aggrieved parents and students who wish to
complain about the adequacy or quality of
educational services received. Decisions
about the provision of special education
services made by officials under Education
Acts are generally not reviewable.32 The
exception is the system in the Northern
Territory where parents of children with
special needs may lodge a complaint in the
Supreme Court if they cannot reach an
agreement with the minister regarding
special arrangements for their child.33
Disgruntled students elsewhere have taken
legal action against their educators under
discrimination legislation.34 Whilst positive
outcomes for students can be achieved
through conciliation processes, the vast
majority of special needs discrimination
cases that proceed to tribunals or courts go
against the complainant.35 This does not
mean there is no merit to the complaint per
se, but rather some key precedents go
against complainants in school disability
matters.36 Another problem with making a
27 Kretschmar v State of Queensland [1989] Aust Torts Reports 80.
28 Babie, Russo and Dickinson, op cit n 17, 49. See also Withyman v State of NSW [2010] NSWDC 186, at [396]. In
Canada, see Dziwenka v R [1972] SCR 419.
29 Withyman v State of NSW [2010] NSWDC 186.
30 Ibid, at 250, 256. The court did not find the educational authority vicariously liable because the teacher was acting
outside the scope of her employment. It held that the teacher must have acted in a ‘moment of madness’ which was not
foreseeable by the department. Inappropriate behaviour on the part of the student was unquestionably foreseeable, the
court said, but not on the part of the teacher (at 255).
31 Note that, in some cases, the distinction between educational and supervisory duties may be blurred. For example in
Parkin v ACT Schools [2005] ACTSC 3, a student incurred an injury to his hand in an industrial design class. The class
was being taught by a relief teacher with minimal experience in the use of the machinery. The court held that the injury
was foreseeable, and indeed was foreseen by the regular industrial design teacher. The education department was held to
be under a duty of care to ensure the relief teacher was sufficiently experienced to teach the class. Therefore, incompetent
instruction may provide the basis for a negligence claim; see further RH Jerry, ‘Recovery in tort for educational
malpractice: Problems of theory and policy’ (1980/81) 29 University of Kansas Law Review 195, 209.
32 See, for example, Education (General Provisions) Act 2006 (Qld), s 401 and Education Act 1990 (NSW), s 107 for a list
of reviewable decisions under those Acts.
33 Education Act (NT), Part 5.
34 See, for example, Hinchcliffe v University of Sydney [2004] FMCA 85; Hurst and Devlin v Education Queensland
[2005] FCA 405; Clarke v Catholic Education Office [2003] FCA 1085. One student brought an action under trade
practices legislation, but his claim was summarily dismissed by the federal magistrate; see Yee Tak On v Dr Linda Hort
(ANU College) [2012] FMCA 391.
35 Walsh, op cit n 10.
36 Particularly the decision of Purvis v New South Wales (2003) 217 CLR 92. Purvis concerned a child with acquired brain
injury who had been excluded from school as a result of his aggressive behaviour. Although it was not in dispute that the
brain injury caused the behaviour problems, the High Court held that the child was not discriminated against on the
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discrimination complaint is that it requires
the student to complain about the conduct
of their teacher or school. Most often, the
issue will be one of resources rather than
discriminatory conduct perpetrated by
individual educators, so complainants are
forced to frame the issue in an artificial
manner. An unintended consequence of this
is that it can damage relationships between
children with special needs and their
communities when, in truth, the student’s
argument is with the education
department.37
‘Educational malpractice’ has never been
claimed in Australia, but the general
principle in Australian law is that
professionals who possess a degree of skill
and knowledge, and hold themselves out as
experts in a particular area of activity, must
exercise reasonable care in the exercise of
their professional activities.38 The Civil
Liability Acts in each state and territory give
some protection to a standard of practice
that is consistent with ‘peer professional
opinion’ so that, if a professional acts in a
manner that was widely accepted as
competent professional practice by a
significant number of respected peers, the
professional does not breach their duty of
care.39 This is consistent with the standard
of ‘ordinary care’.40 This standard has not
yet been applied to professionals with
responsibility for educating children with
special needs in Australia.
Establishing a Duty to Provide
Special Education Services in
Australia
Education departments are public authorities
that exercise a variety of statutory powers,
and it has been held in Australia that a
public authority may be subject to a
common law duty of care when it exercises
a statutory power.41 None of the Australian
Education Acts explicitly impose a duty of
care in relation to the education of children
with special needs, but many do impose
general statutory powers that are relevant.
For example, the Queensland Education
(General Provisions) Act 2006 states at
s 12(a)(i) that: ‘For each student attending a
State instructional institution, there must be
provided an educational program approved
by the Minister that has regard to the age,
ability, aptitude and development of the
student’. In relation specifically to special
needs children, the Western Australian
Education and Training Reform Act 2006
states that where a child with a disability is
enrolled at a government school, the
principal is to consult with the child’s
parents, teachers and if appropriate the
child, and take into account the wishes of
the parents for the purpose of addressing the
child’s educational requirements.42 These
sections do not expressly impose a duty of
care, or specify a remedy. But by their terms,
they do seem to impose obligations on
basis of his disability, but rather on the basis of his behaviour. Since it is not unlawful to treat a person less favourably
on the basis of their behaviour, the school was found to have acted lawfully in excluding him. I have discussed this case
at length elsewhere; see Walsh, op cit nn 9 and 10.
37 See further Walsh, op cit n 9.
38 Mutual Life and Citizen’s Insurance Co Ltd v Evatt (1970) 122 CLR 628; Hedley Byrne and Co v Heller and Partners
Ltd [1964] AC 465; Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479; Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957]
1 WLR 582. The terminology ‘educational malpractice’ is used particularly in the United States: see for example RD
Mawdsley and JJ Cumming, ‘Educational malpractice and setting damages for ineffective teaching: A comparison of legal
principles in the USA, England and Australia’ (2008) 20(1) Education and the Law 25.
39 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), ss 5O, 5P; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 22; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), ss 40, 41;
Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 22; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), ss 58, 59; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5PB (health
professionals only). The common law of Australia is consistent with this, and UK the decision of Sidaway v Governors
of Bethlem Royal Hospital has been affirmed in Australia: see particularly Sidaway v Governors of the Bethlem Royal
Hospital [1985] AC 871, 881. Note that the approach of the court in Sidaway has been preferred over the Bolam test in
Australia; see Naxakis v Western General Hospital (1999) 197 CLR 269, at 275, 285, 297; Rogers v Whitaker (1992)
175 CLR 479, at 484.
40 See, for example, Whitehouse v Jordan [1981] 1 All ER 267, 280.
41 Of course, as Brennan J said in Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424, 482, a ‘statutory power is not
the same thing as a statutory duty’.
42 Education and Training Reform Act 2006 (WA), s 73. These provisions may be contrasted with provisions in other
jurisdictions that are similar but use discretionary rather than proscriptive language. For example, the ACT Education
Act 2004 states at s 7(3) that: ‘Everyone involved in the administration of this Act . . . is to apply the principle that
36 [2015] Ed Law
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educational departments in relation to the
provision of special education services.
It is a well-settled principle that when
statutory powers are exercised, reasonable
care must be taken.43 There is little doubt
that education departments are aware that if
they fail to provide special education
services to children with special needs, those
children may suffer harm as a result.
However, mere foreseeability of harm is not
enough to found a claim in negligence.44 It
would need to be established that a duty to
avoid certain types of damage exists in the
provision of special education services to
children with special educational needs. It
would need to be established that, by not
providing certain special education services
to a particular child, the education
department is in breach of that duty. And it
would have to be proven that some
actionable damage resulted from this breach.
In Australia, there is no general test for
determining whether a duty of care exists,
and there is a divergence of views amongst
members of the High Court on how the
duty question should be resolved.45 The
High Court has emphasised that it must not
be determined merely on the basis of factual
similarities to other cases, rather, precedent
and principle must prevail46 to prevent
judicial decisions from becoming ‘nothing
more than idiosyncratic or personal
responses to the circumstances of a
particular case’.47 Most members of the
High Court have expressed a preference for
taking an ‘incremental approach’48 to the
development of the law of negligence, and
many members of the court have
commented that, in novel cases, a duty of
care should only be recognised ‘by analogy
with established categories’.49 But how is
one to formulate such an analogy?50
There is a general cautiousness amongst the
High Court in imposing affirmative common
law duties on statutory authorities.51 As one
judge has remarked:
‘When courts are invited to pass
judgment on the reasonableness of
government action or inaction, they may
be confronted by issues that are
inappropriate for judicial resolution, and
that, in a representative democracy, are
ordinarily decided through the political
process.’52
It has been held that for a common law
duty to be imposed on a public authority,
the statute must both impose a duty to
exercise the power, and confer a private
school education should: (a) recognise the individual needs of children with disabilities; and (b) should make appropriate
provision for those needs, unless it would impose unjustifiable hardship on the provider of the school education’. This is
more aspirational than binding. In the WA School Education Act 1999, recognition of the right of every child to receive
an education and meeting the educational needs of all children are objects of the Act, but persons with functions under
the Act are only directed to ‘seek to ensure’ that these objects are achieved (ss 3(1)(a), (c), (2)). Two of the ‘objects’ of
the NSW Education Act 1990 are to assist each child to achieve their potential, and to provide special education
assistance to children with disabilities, and under Part 5, the Minister may provide special or additional assistance to
children with special needs, but none of this is proscribed. Similarly, the Northern Territory Education Act (s 6(1)(a))
states that the Minister may take all measures to ‘assist parents of children in the Territory in fulfilling their
responsibility to educate their children according to the individual needs and abilities of those children’. Note also
relevant provisions in the Victorian Education and Training Reform Act 2006. There it is expressly stated that ‘all
Victorians . . . should have access to a high quality education that realises their learning potential and maximizes their
education and training achievement’, but in a separate provision, it is said that this does not establish a legally
enforceable entitlement (see ss 1.2.1, 1.2.3).
43 Caledonian Colleries Ltd v Speirs (1957) 97 CLR 202, 220; Heyman, op cit n 41, at 436, 458; Brodie v Singleton Shire
Council (2001) 206 CLR 512, 620.
44 Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Hayne and Callinan JJ in Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562, 573; Gleeson CJ in
Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540, 555; Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ in Stuart v
Kirkland-Veenstra (2009) 237 CLR 215, 248.
45 McHugh J in Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee (1999) 200 CLR 1, 33.
46 Ibid, 32.
47 Kirby J in Brodie, op cit n 43, 592.
48 Note Hayne J’s criticisms of the incremental approach in Brodie, that recovery becomes an ‘accident of history’: Brodie,
op cit n 43, at 631.
49 See Brennan J in Heyman, op cit n 41, at 481; Crimmins, op cit n 45, Hayne J at 97 and McHugh J at 97 and 29.
50 Hayne J recognised this problem in Brodie, op cit n 43, at 622.
51 McHugh J in Crimmins, op cit n 45, at 34.
52 Gleeson CJ in Graham Barclay Oysters, op cit n 44, at 553.
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right of action for breach of that duty.53
Whether such conditions exist will be a
matter of statutory interpretation.54 Yet at
least one judge has cautioned against
referring to the intention of the legislature,
for this is a ‘realm of great uncertainty’.55 In
one case, the court suggested that where no
intention is stated, regard may be had to
presumptions or policy to supply the
intention.56
The relevant provisions in the Civil Liability
Acts must also be considered. Whilst the
Civil Liability Acts are broadly consistent
with the common law,57 they do impose
specific considerations that are relevant to
the position of public authorities. For
example, the Acts state that the fact that a
public authority exercises a function does
not of itself indicate that the authority is
under a duty to exercise the function, or
that the function should be exercised in
particular circumstances or in a particular
way.58
Do Australian Education
Departments Have a Duty of Care in
Relation to the Provision of Special
Education Services?
Whilst there are differences in methodology,
there now seems to be agreement that a
‘salient features’ approach should be taken
to determining whether a duty of care
should be imposed in a particular situation;
that is, a number of features must be
combined and weighed against one another
when determining whether a duty of care
should be imposed upon a public
authority.59 The salient features have been
identified as including: reasonable
foreseeability; the subject of the powers; the
vulnerability of the recipient of the powers;
the knowledge of the risk; whether the
decision made should be characterised as
operational or policy in nature; and ‘other’
relevant factors.60 No direction has been
provided by the High Court as to when a
collection of salient features will be of
sufficient weight to attract a duty of care, so
each novel case must be decided on its own
facts.61 In this next section, each of the
features will be examined, in turn, to
53 Brennan J in Heyman, op cit n 41, 482.
54 Ibid, 482; Kirby J in Graham Barclay Oysters, op cit n 44, 617. Note that statutory interpretation is not synonymous
with parliamentary intention. Deference to the intention of the legislature has been criticised, by Hayne J in Brodie, op
cit n 43, 633 and McHugh and Gummow JJ in Byrne v Australian Airlines (1995) 185 CLR 410, 458, and by Kirby J in
Graham Barclay Oysters, op cit n 44, 617. Rather, it is said, the ‘nature, scope and terms of the statute’ should be
paramount.
55 Kirby J seems to suggest that there is a risk that the court might ‘simply give effect to its own ideas of what is desirable,
attributing those ideas to the legislature’s “intention” ’ in Graham Barclay Oysters, op cit n 44, 617.
56 Stuart v Kirkland-Veenstra, op cit n 44, per Crennan and Kiefel JJ at 263.
57 Stewart and Stuhmcke note, in the context of tort law, that both common law and statute law emanate from the same
common law legal tradition; that common law should not be considered to be in the ‘shadow’ of legislation, but rather
common law and statute law have a symbiotic relationship. They also examine the tendency of the High Court to
interpret the Civil Liability Acts as consistently as possible with the common law: P Stewart and A Stumcke, ‘The rise of
the common law in statutory interpretation of tort law reform legislation: Oil and water or a milky pond?’ (2013) 21
Tort Law Journal 126.
58 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 114; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 46; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 43;
Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 85; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5AA. See further the provisions regarding resource
allocation, discussed below at pp 41–42 and 45–47.
59 The salient features approach seems to have been solidified in Graham Barclay Oysters, op cit n 44, see Gummow and
Hayne JJ at 597, Kirby J at 624 and Callinan J at 663–664. The salient features approach to negligence is lamented by
Kirby J at 624–626. Kirby J’s view is that the salient features approach means that there is essentially only one question
to be answered in novel cases: is it, in all the circumstances, reasonable to impose upon one a duty of care to the other?
(Graham Barclay Oysters, op cit n 44, 627). See also Tame v NSW; Annetts v Australian Stations Pty Ltd (2002) 211
CLR 317, 395, and later Stuart v Kirkland-Veenstra, op cit n 44, 254.
60 McHugh J in Crimmins, op cit n 45, at 39. See also Graham Barclay Oysters, op cit n 44, 597 for a similar list. See also
Caltex Refineries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Stavar [2009] NSWCA 258, per Allsop P at [103].
61 See M Stubbs, ‘Prosper the government, suffer the practitioner: The Graham Barclay Oysters litigation’ (2003) 26(3)
University of New South Wales Law Journal 727.
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determine whether a duty to provide special
needs education services could be imposed
on educational authorities in Australia.62
1. Reasonable Foreseeability
The threshold question in relation to
reasonable foreseeability is: was the harm
which the plaintiff suffered a reasonably
foreseeable result of the defendant’s act or
omission,63 that is, could the defendant have
had in contemplation the damage that
arose?64
In every Australian jurisdiction, a school,
teacher or parent may request a certain level
or kind of support for a child with special
needs; the education department then makes
a determination about how much, and what
kind, of assistance it will fund or provide
for that child.65 An educational authority
necessarily has the risk of damage to the
child in contemplation when it makes this
decision;66 it will have before it all the
available evidence relating to the child’s
difficulties, and the reasons why the school
feels it cannot educate that child in the
ordinary way.
If a child with special needs does not receive
the support services he or she requires to
access the curriculum, then it is certainly
foreseeable that they may not acquire basic
literacy and numeracy skills.67 The
difficulties faced by a child with poor
literacy or numeracy will compound over
time – if early skill development is
compromised, the child may find it difficult
to catch up. If their educational difficulties
remain unresolved, it is reasonably
foreseeable that their employment prospects
will be compromised; that they may suffer
low self-esteem; and that they may even lose
the chance of becoming an economically
productive citizen. Whether these forms of
harm constitute actionable damage is
another matter, and this is discussed further
below. However, it is certainly arguable that
it is reasonably foreseeable that a child with
special needs will suffer harm if appropriate
educational support services are not
provided to them at school.
2. The Subject or Beneficiary of the
Powers
A distinction is often made in the Australian
cases between statutory powers that are
exercised for the benefit of the public at
large, and those that are exercised for the
62 Note, however, that the ‘salient features’ approach has not been universally endorsed. According to Gaudron J in
Crimmins, there are only two questions to be answered when determining whether a statutory authority owed a duty of
care to the plaintiff: whether the powers and functions conferred on the authority were compatible with the existence of
that duty; and whether the relationship between the authority and the plaintiff was of a kind that gave rise to such a
duty: Crimmins, op cit n 45, at 16. It is in relation to the first question that distinctions such as policy/operational
factors, discretionary/non-discretionary powers and powers/duties were considered relevant (Crimmins, at 19). Gummow
and Hayne JJ come up with a similar formulation in Barclay Oysters: (1) coexistence of knowledge of harm and the
power to avoid it; and (2) the totality of the relationship between the parties: Graham Barclay Oysters, op cit n 44, 596.
For them, it is in relation to the second question that the various ‘salient features’ are examined, including control,
vulnerability and consistency: Graham Barclay Oysters, op cit n 44, 597.
63 McHugh J in Crimmins, op cit n 45, 32.
64 Gleeson CJ in Tame v NSW, op cit n 59, 336.
65 Australian Capital Territory Department of Education and Training, Student Centres Appraisal of Need (2010); New
South Wales Department of Education and Training, Students with Disabilities in Regular Classes: Funding Support
(undated); Northern Territory Department of Education and Training, Students with Disabilities Policy 2012;
Queensland Department of Education, Training and Employment, Education Adjustment Program Handbook 2014;
South Australia Department of Education and Children’s Services, Disability Support Program: Five-Step Process (2007);
Tasmania Department of Education, Register of Students with Severe Disabilities (2013); Victoria Department of
Education and Early Childhood Development, Program for Students with Disabilities: Guidelines for Schools 2015
(2014); Western Australia Department of Education and Training, Schools Plus: Resourcing Informed Practice Handbook
(2006).
66 In Annetts v Australian Stations Pty Ltd, the court held that since the parents had expressed concerns about their son’s
welfare, and sought assurances as to his safety, their son’s employer must have had the risks to his safety in
contemplation, and should have taken reasonable steps to provide adequate supervision; Tame v NSW, op cit n 59, per
Gleeson CJ at 337 and Gaudron J at 341.
67 As Collingsworth has said, ‘[a]n obvious foreseeable risk of incompetent teaching is impaired learning’: TP
Collingsworth, ‘Applying negligence doctrine to the teaching profession’ (1982) 11 Journal of Law and Education 479,
501.
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benefit of a specific class of people.68 It has
been said that powers that are exercised for
the public generally cannot be the subject of
a duty of care; rather the powers must be
exercised for the benefit of a particular class
of persons only. As one judge has said:
‘Ordinarily, the more general the
statutory duty and the wider the class of
persons in the community who it may
be expected will derive benefit from its
performance, the less likely it is that the
statute can be construed as conferring
an individual right of action for
damages for its non-performance.’69
Yet, the powers exercised by educational
departments in relation to the provision of
special education services are directed at a
very specific class of people: school students
with special educational needs. The duty
proposed is not owed to the public at large,
but rather to a specific and identifiable class
of individuals. Therefore, this feature is
satisfied.
3. Vulnerability and Control
It seems from this ‘salient feature’ that a
duty will only be found in situations where
individuals are vulnerable to harm from
dangers which they cannot control,
understand or recognise.70 The powers
vested in an authority by statute may give it
such a measure of control over the safety of
the person to oblige it to exercise its powers
to avert danger.71 While the existence of
such powers, alone, might not give rise to a
duty of care, ‘if the authority has used its
powers to intervene in a field of activity’
and so increased the risk of harm to a
person, it may come under a duty of care.72
The doctrine of general reliance has been
rejected by many Australian judges as a
‘fiction’,73 yet the concepts of ‘vulnerability’
and ‘control’ are still considered relevant
and are still discussed in the cases.74 For
example, in one case, the fact that the victim
was a minor was considered relevant when
determining whether the defendant was
under a duty of care to ensure his safety.75
In another, the court remarked that a duty is
owed by a gaoler to a prisoner because the
prisoner has been denied personal liberty
and the gaoler has assumed control over
them.76
A child at school is, similarly, limited in
their personal autonomy. A child with
special needs in a school setting is all the
more vulnerable. The parents of children
with special needs send them to school, in
accordance with the law, under the
assumption that they will be educated
there.77 They rely on the teachers, the school
and ultimately the education department to
ensure that their child’s educational needs
are met so that they can participate in
school activities. As the House of Lords has
noted, ‘the education of the pupil is the very
68 Brennan J in Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 192 CLR 330, 347; Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow JJ in Brodie, op cit
n 43, 577.
69 Hayne J in Brodie, op cit n 43, 633.
70 McHugh J in Day, op cit n 68, 370; McHugh J in Crimmins, op cit n 45, 40; Heyman, op cit n 41, 464; Hayne J in
Brodie, op cit n 43, 623.
71 Gummow J in Crimmins, op cit n 45, 61; Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ in Brodie, op cit n 43, 558; Burnie Port
Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520, 551–552.
72 McHugh J in Graham Barclay Oysters, op cit n 44, 576, 580.
73 Gummow J in Day, op cit n 68, 387; Hayne J in Brodie, op cit n 43, 627.
74 As to ‘vulnerability’, see Kirby J in Day, op cit n 68, 423; Gaudron J in Crimmins, op cit n 45, 24. As to ‘control’, see
Gleeson CJ in Graham Barclay Oysters, op cit n 44, 558. Although, in Brodie, Hayne says the concepts of reliance and
vulnerability are ‘legal fictions’ and that neither are ‘useful analytical tools’. Rather, he says they are merely statements of
conclusion since many public authorities provide facilities and services that the public have no choice but to use: Brodie,
op cit n 43, 627.
75 Tame v New South Wales; Annetts v Australian Stations Pty Ltd (2002) 211 CLR 317 per Gleeson CJ at 337 and
Gaudron J at 341.
76 Stuart v Kirkland-Veenstra, op cit n 44, 249.
77 P Gallagher, ‘The kids aren’t alright: Why courts should impose a constitutional duty on schools to protect students’
(2001) 8 Georgetown Journal on Poverty Law and Policy 377, 379; F Hay-Mackenzie, ‘Tackling the bullies: In the
classroom and in the staffroom’ (2002) 7(2) Australia and New Zealand Journal of Law and Education 87, 96. The
flipside of this argument is that compulsory education laws actually impose a duty on parents to have their children
educated, since the state is the party that is capable of enforcing such laws: see R Funston, ‘Educational malpractice: A
cause of action in search of a theory’ (1980–1981) 18 San Diego Law Review 743, 777.
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L
purpose for which the child goes to
school’.78 Depending on the nature of their
disabilities, it may not be possible for a
child with special needs to access the whole
curriculum, but parents rely on educators to
set realistic educational goals for their child,
and to work towards them with appropriate
support services in place.79
Further, by accepting the enrolment of a
child, a school is ‘intervening in a field of
activity’: it is undertaking to educate the
child. The act of admitting children to
school for the purpose of education suggests
that schools are assuming a duty to educate.
Funston likens the legal duty to educate
with the duty to rescue, saying:
‘The uneducated child is like a potential
victim in need of rescue. When the
schools undertake the attempt to
educate this child, though they need not
succeed, they do assume a duty to make
the attempt non-negligently. If
educational alternatives are available
and the school negligently fails to utilize
them, it has not acted reasonably under
the circumstances and should be liable
in tort.’80
There is no doubt that students with special
needs are vulnerable to education
departments, and that parents rely heavily
upon them in relation to the education of
their children. Thus, this feature is arguably
satisfied.
4. Knowledge of Risk
Another ‘salient feature’ is that the
defendant knew, or ought to have known, of
the risk of harm to the specific class
including the plaintiff if it did not exercise
its powers.81 That is, the authority must
have been in a position to take steps to
minimise the risks for a duty to be
imposed.82 Since negligence is a ‘fault based
system’, it would ‘offend current community
standards’ to impose liability in situations
where the defendant could not have
apprehended the possibility of damage.83
Obviously, education departments are in a
position to avert the risks to students with
special needs that arise from not being
appropriately supported in the school
environment. The educational departments
ultimately make the decision as to whether,
and to what degree, a child will receive
funding for educational supports. They also
determine how much funding is allocated to
special education services in general. In
theory, it is within the power of the
department to increase this amount in order
to avert the risk of harm to a particular
student.
However, in practice, decisions regarding the
allocation of funds to specific children are
complex. The officers that are charged with
determining how much funding each child
receives are provided with a limited amount
of funds to distribute. They may, therefore,
be required to balance the needs of students
against one another to decide how the funds
should be allocated. The reality may be that
the funds they are allocated are insufficient
to ensure that adequate support is available
to every child that needs it. This leads into
the next salient feature for discussion: the
distinction between operational and policy
decisions.
5. Operational or Policy Decision
It has long been said that public authorities
will not owe a duty of care in relation to
matters that involve an exercise of ‘core
policy-making’ powers or ‘functions of a
78 X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council; M (A Minor) v Newham London Borough Council; E (A Minor) v Dorset
County Council [1995] 2 AC 633, 766.
79 In the UK, see G (A Child) v Bromley London Borough Council (2000) 2 LGLR 237. The child in this case suffered
from cerebral palsy, epilepsy and vision problems. His educational requirements included physiotherapy, occupational
therapy and speech therapy.
80 Funston, op cit n 77, 772.
81 McHugh J in Day, op cit n 68, 371. As noted in Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562, 577, these premises may be
derived from the original doctrine of negligence outlined by Lord Atkin in Donoghue v Stevenson where the fact
establishing liability was that the consumer was unable to discover the defect.
82 Gaudron J in Crimmins, op cit n 45, 25.
83 McHugh J in Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1991) 198 CLR 180, 230; also cited in Crimmins, op cit n 45, 41.
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quasi-legislative character’.84 Budgetary
allocations are often put in the
policy-making category, and thus considered
exempt from negligence claims.85 If the
courts cannot review decisions that are
made on the basis of policy decisions
regarding the allocation of resources, are
education departments automatically
immune from the imposition of a duty of
care in relation to special needs education?86
The relevance of the allocation of resources
to the duty of care issue was raised, in a
policing context, in the UK case of Hill v
Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police.87
In that case, the House of Lords noted that
police officers make a variety of decisions
on matters of ‘policy and discretion’
including those involving the deployment of
available resources.88 It was held that a duty
of care was inconsistent with these
functions, and that no duty was owed by
police officers to members of the public who
might suffer injury as a result of the actions
of an offender who they carelessly failed to
apprehend. There are some similarities here:
police departments have a limited amount of
funds available, and they make internal
decisions on the allocation of resources to
different cases depending on their
determined priorities. Education department
officers must similarly distribute a finite
amount of funds amongst children.
According to one judge of the Australian
High Court, the proper question is whether
taking the particular course of action
suggested would have interfered with the
department’s budgetary priorities or
‘distorted its priorities in the discharge of its
statutory functions’.89 Detailed costing
information would be required to answer
this question, but inquiries of this nature are
not foreign to the courts. Decisions about
what is reasonable in a broad budgetary
sense are taken in other settings, including
discrimination matters.90 In the area of
negligence, such considerations may be more
relevant to the question of breach than
whether there was a duty in the first place.91
That is, if a duty is found to exist, questions
of budget may be examined when
determining what action the public authority
might reasonably have taken to avert the
risk of harm to the plaintiff.92
Either way, it would be open to a judge to
conclude that decisions regarding the
allocation of funds to special needs services
should not be exempt from a finding of
negligence merely because they are of a
policy nature.93
6. Other Supervening Reasons in
Policy to Deny the Existence of a
Duty of Care
There may be other reasons, in policy, to
find that no duty of care existed in the
84 Deane J in Heyman, op cit n 41, 499. See also Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1978] AC 728, 754; Mason J
in Heyman, op cit n 41, 457.
85 Note, however that the distinction between policy and operational decisions has not been universally supported in
Australia: see Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ in Brodie, op cit n 43, 560; and Gummow and Toohey JJ in Day, op
cit n 68. The policy/operational distinction has been discredited by some commentators and has been rejected by the US
Supreme Court. It was also rejected by the House of Lords in X (Minors), op cit n 78.
86 As a former Chief Justice of the High Court has said, the fact that budgetary allocations are at play in a decision should
not immunise a public authority from the imposition of a common law duty of care because the same exemption is not
afforded to individuals and corporations, who must also manage budgets: Gleeson CJ in Graham Barclay Oysters, op cit
n 44, 556.
87 Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [1989] AC 53.
88 Ibid, 59.
89 Gummow J in Day, op cit n 68, 392.
90 See for example Waters v Public Transport Corporation (1992) 173 CLR 349; Cocks v State of Queensland [1994]
QADT 4.
91 See Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ in Brodie, op cit n 43, 559; Gleeson CJ in Graham Barclay Oysters, op cit n
44, 557. Note, however, this is criticised by Hayne J in Brodie – he warns that this will shift the balance in favour of
plaintiffs and against defendants: Brodie, op cit n 43, 627. He also notes that it may be difficult to determine what kind
of authority is ‘reasonable’ for the purpose of determining what action should have been taken. He says (at 629): ‘Is it
relevant to know what kind of political pressures an elected body, such as a local council, faced when it prepared its
budget?’.
92 This is discussed further below at pp 45–47.
93 However, in some jurisdictions, the Civil Liability Acts render this conclusion less open to the courts: see pp 46–47
below in relation to breach.
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L
circumstances. One example is where the
imposition of a duty of care is inconsistent
with the statutory scheme.94 In Sullivan v
Moody, the High Court held that no duty
could be owed by child welfare officers to
suspected abusers because child welfare
authorities operated within a broader
scheme for the protection of children. The
court noted that a common law duty of care
to alleged abusers would be ‘inconsistent
with the proper and effective discharge of
those responsibilities’.95 Yet, that is not the
case with respect to special education in
school settings. The purpose of schools is to
appropriately and effectively educate
children – no inconsistent duties are
apparent.
The ‘cost to the community of defensive
measures’ is another reason why it might be
considered prudent to deny the existence of
a duty of care in some circumstances.96 It is
often noted that imposing a duty of care in
the exercise of statutory powers might
change the practice of public authorities so
that they act in a defensive manner, with a
view to avoiding liability.97 Acting in a
defensive manner may not be consistent
with Parliament’s intention when conferring
those powers.98 Yet, empirical research has
discredited the idea that liability in
negligence can distort priorities affecting
service delivery.99 And as one High Court
judge has said: ‘[w]hilst the promotion of
individual choice and the efficient use of
resources is a proper concern for public
authorities, so is the adoption of good
administration and procedures for the
proper use of statutory powers’.100
In the context of the education of children
with special needs, defensive practice might
mean that more resources are allocated to
special education services at the expense of
able-bodied students. But the reality is that
if special education services are not provided
to children with special needs, the classroom
teacher will be obliged to meet the needs of
those students, which will detract from the
educational experience of other students in
the classroom.101 Teachers confirm that they
are better able to meet the needs of all
students if children with special needs are
adequately and appropriately supported.102
So, defensive practice in this context might
actually be beneficial in a broader sense.103
One argument run in the US against
imposing a duty of care on education
departments in relation to the provision of
special education services is the ‘alternate
remedy’ policy argument.104 In the US, there
is a federal scheme in place under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA) that requires schools to provide
special education services to students who
require them, and remedies are available to
parents and students where appropriate
supports are not provided.105 It has been
argued that since parents of children with
special needs have other, more appropriate,
avenues for redress available to them, there
is no need for a duty of care to be
94 McHugh J in Crimmins, op cit n 45, 46.
95 Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562, 582.
96 Stovin v Wise [1996] AC 923, 955; McHugh J in Crimmins, op cit n 45, 50.
97 X (Minors), op cit n 78, 653.
98 Hayne J in Crimmins, op cit n 45, 102.
99 J Hartshorne, N Smith and R Everton, ‘Caparo under fire: A study into the effects upon the fire service of liability in
negligence’ (2000) 63(4) Modern Law Review 502, 514–515.
100 Kirby J in Day, op cit n 68, 423.
101 Senate Committee on Employment, Workplace Relations and Education References Committee, op cit n 7, 34–35.
102 See for example TE Scruggs and MA Mastropieri, ‘Teacher perceptions of mainstreaming/inclusion 1958–1995: A
research synthesis’ (1996) 63(1) Exceptional Children 59; JM Baker and N Zigmond, ‘Are regular education classes
equipped to accommodate students with learning disabilities?’ (1990) 56(6) Exceptional Children 515.
103 EJ Ryan, ‘Failing the system? Enforcing the right to education in New Zealand’ (2004) 35 Victoria University of
Wellington Law Review 735, 758.
104 B Markesinis and AR Stewart, ‘Tortious liability for negligent misdiagnosis of learning disabilities: A comparative study
of English and American law’ (2001) 36 Texas International Law Journal 427, 433, 449, 462.
105 See the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act 2004 (US); Donohue v Copiague Union Free School
District 64 App Div 2d 29 (1978), 38–39. See also Hoffman v Board of Education of the City of New York 49 NY 2d
121 (1979), 127.
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recognised.106 Yet, just as Markesinis and
Stewart note that there is no corollary to
IDEA in UK law, there is likewise nothing at
all akin to this in Australia.107
Can Breach of Duty be Established?
Proof of Breach
In order to prove breach of duty, the
question that must be asked is, as a question
of fact, what would a reasonable person in
the position of the defendant have done to
prevent the injury? In relation to the
education of children with special needs, the
inquiry would be whether the educational
authority has taken reasonable steps to
prevent students with special needs from
suffering harm as a result of a failure to
provide them with adequate, appropriate
educational supports.
Under Australian common law, the factors
to be considered when determining the
degree of response required are ‘the
magnitude of the risk and the degree of
probability of its occurrence, along with the
expense, difficulty and inconvenience in
taking alleviating action and any other
conflicting responsibilities the defendant
may have’.108 This is broadly consistent with
the considerations imposed under the Civil
Liability Acts. Under most of the Civil
Liability Acts, in deciding whether a
reasonable person would have taken
precautions against a risk of harm, the court
must consider the burden of taking
precautions to avoid the risk of harm, and
the social utility (or potential net benefit) of
the activity that creates the risk of harm.109
Also, the court must consider whether or
not, and why, responsibility for the harm
should be imposed on the defendant.110 In
this case, therefore, the court would need to
examine the reasonableness of the
expenditure required and whether a
reasonable authority in the position of the
education department would have made the
decisions it did.
What Supports Should Have Been
Provided?
In Hurst and Devlin v Education
Queensland, a discrimination matter
concerning special education services
provided to children with hearing
impairment, Lander J remarked:
‘The court is not an expert on education
and, more particularly, on the education
of profoundly deaf children. Decisions
as to the appropriate method of the
education of profoundly deaf children
should be made by those qualified to
make them, namely, educators, after a
consideration of all of the evidence and
all of the views whether favourable or
unfavourable.’111
Whilst the relevance of this remark to
negligence cases might be questioned, in the
US, the courts have reached a similar
conclusion in educational malpractice
matters. In Donohue v Copiague Union Free
School District, it was held that the extent
to which teachers and schools are
considered legally responsible for the
educational outcomes of children must be
limited because ‘[t]he courts are an
inappropriate forum to test the efficacy of
educational programs and pedagogical
methods’.112 On the contrary, Markesinis
and Stewart note that a standard of care is
easily reducible in the case of failure to
106 This was raised as an argument against finding a duty of care in the UK education and social welfare cases also; see
Barrett v London Borough of Enfield [2001] 2 AC 550, 554, 568–569 and 589; X (Minors) op cit n 78, 751.
107 Markesinis and Stewart, op cit n 104.
108 Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40, 44–49; affirmed in Brodie, op cit n 43, 577 by Gaudron, McHugh
and Gummow JJ. See also Romeo v Conservation Commission of the Northern Territory (1998) 192 CLR 431, per
Toohey and Gummow JJ at 454 and Gaudron J at 462.
109 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 43(2); Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 5B; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld),
s 9(2); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 32; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 11(2); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 48(2); Civil
Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5B(2).
110 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 43(2); Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 5B; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld)
s 9(2); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 32; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 11(2); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 48(2); Civil
Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5C.
111 Hurst and Devlin v Education Queensland [2005] FCA 405, at 479.
112 Donohue v Copiague Union Free School District 64 App Div 2d 29 (1978), 35.
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diagnose learning difficulties by asking
whether there were signs, and whether it
was reasonable that these signs should have
been detected by someone exercising
reasonable skill.113 Taking this one step
further, it seems equally straightforward to
assess the reasonableness of a failure by the
education department to act upon a
diagnosis, or identification of need, once it
has been made.
In most circumstances, it will be possible to
identify what would have constituted a
minimum standard of care. In Board of
Education v Rowley, the US Supreme Court
said the standard of education owed to
special education students will be satisfied if
the child is provided with ‘personalized
instruction with sufficient support services
to permit the child to benefit educationally
from that instruction’.114 Similarly, in the
UK case of Phelps v London Borough of
Hillingdon; Anderton and Clwyd County
Council, Lord Slynn remarked that all that
is expected is ‘ordinary skill’.115 This is not
a particularly stringent standard – it does
not require access to the curriculum, it only
requires educational benefit.
However, it must be acknowledged that
there are many factors that may influence a
child’s educational performance and literacy
acquisition. The child’s individual
characteristics – medical, social, emotional,
behavioural, financial and cultural – will
have a role in their academic proficiency, in
addition to the role of the educators.116 But
a multifaceted inquiry must always be
undertaken to determine causation. At law,
a person may be responsible for damage
when his or her conduct was one of a
number of conditions sufficient to produce
the damage,117 and whether the breach
caused the damage will ‘ultimately [be] a
matter of common sense’.118
Under the Australian Civil Liability Acts, the
question for the court is twofold: first, it
must be established that the negligence was
a necessary condition of the occurrence of
the harm (known as ‘factual causation’); and
second, it must be concluded that it is
appropriate for the scope of the negligent
person’s liability to extend to the harm so
caused.119 The High Court has indicated
that, to establish factual causation, a
plaintiff must turn its mind to possibilities
that might have eventuated if circumstances
had been different.120 In this case, therefore,
a plaintiff would need to show that it was
more probable than not that, but for the
provision of appropriate special education
services, the harm would not have
occurred.121 It would certainly be possible to
argue this. Sufficient research and expert
knowledge is available to evaluate claims
that inadequate educational support has
resulted in avoidable deficits.122 Indeed, in
Phelps, the House of Lords was able to find,
in agreement with the trial judge, that if one
of the plaintiffs had received teaching
appropriate to her needs, she would be
‘somewhat, perhaps substantially, more
literate than she is now’ and would likely be
more employable.123
The Relevance of Resource Allocation
Of course, as noted above, a decision not to
provide educational support services or
113 Markesinis and Stewart, op cit n 104, 443.
114 Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v Rowley 458 US 176 (1982), 203.
115 Phelps v London Borough of Hillingdon; Anderton and Clwyd County Council [2001] 2 AC 619, 655.
116 Funston, op cit n 77, 786. This has been raised as a reason for not recognising a duty of care in the context of
educational malpractice claims in the US; see Peter W v San Francisco Unified School District 60 Cal App 3d 814
(1976), 824–825; Donohue v Copiague Union Free School District 64 App Div 2d 29 (1978), 34; JG Culhane,
‘Reinvigorating educational malpractice claims: A representational focus’ (1992) 67 Washington Law Review 349, 389.
117 March v E and MH Stramere Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506, per Mason CJ, 509.
118 Ibid, 515.
119 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 45(1); Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 5D(1); Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld),
s 11(1); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 34(1); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 13(1); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 51(1);
Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5C(1).
120 Adeels Palace Pty Ltd v Moubarak (2009) 239 CLR 420, 442.
121 Using the formulation of the High Court in Adeels, ibid, 442.
122 Culhane, op cit n 116, at 360, 363, 373–374.
123 Phelps v London Borough of Hillingdon; Anderton and Clwyd County Council [2001] 2 AC 619, 656 (Lord Slynn of
Hadley).
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facilities to children with special needs will
often be based on budgetary considerations
rather than a deficient needs analysis. In
many cases, teachers’ and schools’ hands are
tied as a result of funding allocations made
by the education department. Unlike the UK
cases which question the professional skill of
the educational psychologists involved with
diagnosis,124 in Australia, the question is
more likely to be one of resource allocation.
As noted above, it has been said that the
competing demands of a public authority’s
resources may go to the question of
breach.125 It has been held in Australia that
budgetary imperatives are amongst those
factual matters to be considered when
determining what should or could have been
done to discharge the duty of care.126 A
duty of care can only require a public
authority to take those steps that a
reasonable authority ‘with the same powers
and resources’ would have taken in the
circumstances.127 In discrimination matters,
courts must engage in similar analyses. For
example, in Woodbury v Australian Capital
Territory, the tribunal was asked to
determine whether the school authority had
discriminated against two boys with Autism
Spectrum Disorder by not providing them
with a particular early intervention service.
The tribunal compared the cost of providing
this service with the overall budget of the
department and found that the cost was
excessive and thus unreasonable as
compared with the cost of providing an
alternative form of early intervention.128
Similar cost analyses could be conducted in
negligence cases to determine what action a
reasonable department should have taken in
the circumstances.
The problem is that, in Australia, civil
liability legislation dictates the manner in
which the resource issue must be dealt with.
Most of the Civil Liability Acts state that,
for the purpose of determining whether a
public authority has a duty (or has breached
its duty), it is relevant to consider that the
authority has limited resources.129 Indeed,
the Acts explicitly state that the general
allocation of resources by public authorities
is not open to challenge.130 This means that,
if the evidence suggested that a department’s
special education budget was inadequate to
meet demand, it could not be argued that
the special education budget should have
been increased to minimise the risk of harm
to students in need.
The Civil Liability Acts also state that, when
deciding how a public authority should have
exercised its functions, the broad range of
activities of the authority must be
considered, and the authority may rely on
evidence of compliance with its own
procedures and standards to establish that
its functions were properly exercised.131 This
provides education departments with broad
protection against negligence claims for
failure to provide special education services.
It would permit a situation where, for
example, an education department by its
policies and procedures limits the kinds of
support it will provide to students, or the
kinds of students it will provide support
124 See for example Skipper v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council [2006] EWCA Civ 238, [2006] ELR 322 where it
was held that the schoool’s failure to diagnose and address the complainant’s dyslexia could result in a successful claim
for damages. See also E (A Minor) v Dorset County Council [1994] ELR 416 where it was held that if an educational
psychology service holds itself out as offering educational psychology services, there is a duty owed to those who avail
themselves of that service.
125 McHugh J in Day, op cit n 68, 371; McHugh J in Crimmins, op cit n 45, at 45.
126 Gummow J in Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 192 CLR 330, 394; citing Supreme Court of Canada, Just v British
Columbia [1989] 2 SCR 1228, 1244.
127 Gaudron J in Crimmins, op cit n 45, at 21; citing Stovin v Wise [1996] AC 923, 933.
128 Woodbury v Australian Capital Territory [2007] ACTDT 4.
129 See generally Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 110(a); Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 42(a); Civil Liability Act
2003 (Qld), s 35(a); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 38(a); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 83(a); Civil Liability Act 2002
(WA), s 5W(a).
130 See generally Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 110(b); Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 42(b); Civil Liability Act
2003 (Qld), s 35(b); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 38(b); Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5W(b).
131 See generally Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 110(c), (d); Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 42(c),(d); Civil
Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 35(c), (d); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 38(c), (d); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 83(b), (c);
Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5W(c), (d).
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to.132 Policies of this nature could insulate
an education department from liability in
negligence, even if the department
unreasonably limits support to children in
need.
One case in the UK provides a stark
contrast to this approach. In R v East
Sussex County Council ex parte Tandy, a
case on breach of statutory duty, resource
considerations were considered irrelevant in
the context of determining whether or not
educational support services should be
provided to children with special needs.133
In that case, a decision was made by the
education authority to reduce the number of
hours home tuition that a sick child received
from five to three. The court found that this
amounted to the breach of a mandatory
statutory duty,134 regardless of the fact that
the decision was made on the basis of
resource limitations. Relevantly, the court
said: ‘To permit a local authority to avoid
performing a statutory duty on the grounds
that it prefers to spend money in other ways
is to downgrade a statutory duty to a
discretionary power’.135 The same might be
said of a duty of care.
The Australian courts are unlikely to affirm
this reasoning, and the Civil Liability Acts
certainly tend to tip the scales in favour of
public authorities. However, they do not
preclude the possibility of recovery by
children with special needs who have not
received adequate special education services.
Much would depend on the content of the
special education policies, and the extent to
which education departments bind
themselves to provide support services to
children with special needs, since it seems
that this is the standard against which they
are to be judged.
Is There Actionable Damage?
Economic Loss and ‘Mental Harm’
It is often said that ‘damage is the gist of
negligence’.136 Therefore, it must be
concluded that the defendant’s negligence
has caused actionable damage if a claim is
to succeed.137
There are many kinds of harm that can arise
if a child fails to acquire basic literacy and
numeracy skills. It is well established that
children will struggle to succeed in life as
adults if they are denied a basic
education.138 Failure to acquire skills in
literacy and numeracy can result in
unemployability, or reduced employability,
and thus lost wages.139 In the short-term, it
can result in substantial costs for parents if
they access private special education services
(such as employing their own teacher’s aide),
or they engage private tutors and therapists
to make up for the lack of state-provided
support.
Failure to provide appropriate educational
support to children with special needs can
also result in psychological harm. In Skipper
v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council,
the UK Court of Appeal held that
frustration, loss of self-confidence and loss
of self-esteem experienced by a child with
132 Queensland provides a current example of this. For a child to receive educational support under its Education
Adjustment Program, he or she must come within one of the six impairment categories (autism spectrum disorder,
hearing impairment, intellectual disability, physical impairment, speech-language impairment and vision impairment). If
a child does not come within one of these impairment categories, it is more difficult to access special education services:
see www.education.qld.gov.au/students/disabilities/adjustment.
133 R v East Sussex County Council ex parte Tandy [1998] AC 714.
134 The House of Lords found that a provision of the Education Act 1993 (UK) created a statutory duty to provide suitable
education to children. The relevant section (s 298(1)) stated: ‘Each local education authority shall make arrangements
for the provision of suitable full-time or part-time education at school or otherwise than at school for those children of
compulsory school age who, by reason of illness, exclusion from school or otherwise, may not for any period receive
suitable education unless such arrangements are made for them’. Subsection 7 defined ‘suitable education’ as ‘efficient
education suitable to his age, ability and aptitude and to any special educational needs he [sic] may have’. Tandy, ibid.
135 Tandy, op cit n 133, 749.
136 Baroness Hale in Gregg v Scott [2005] UKHL 2, [2005] AC 176, 231.
137 See Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock and Engineering Company Ltd, The Wagon Mound [1961] AC 388,
425.
138 Noted in Brown v Board of Education 347 US 483 (1954), 493.
139 D Fairgrieve, ‘A tort remedy for the untaught? Liability for educational malpractice in English law’ [2000] CFLQ 31,
39.
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untreated dyslexia led to reduced enjoyment
of life and loss of amenity, which could
amount to actionable damage.140 In
Australia, psychological impairment has
been recognised as actionable damage in
personal injury cases occurring within
school premises,141 however, under the Civil
Liability Acts, not all forms of psychological
harm can be claimed. For example, a
defendant does not owe a duty to a plaintiff
to take care not to cause mental harm unless
a reasonable person ought to have foreseen
that a person of normal fortitude might, in
the circumstances, suffer a recognised
psychiatric illness if reasonable care were
not taken.142 However, if the defendant
knows that the plaintiff is a person of ‘less
than normal fortitude’, this cannot be
disregarded.143 Children with special needs
would, in some circumstances, be persons of
less than normal fortitude, and the
legislation affirms that they should be taken
as they are found in this regard.
Further to this, in five Australian
jurisdictions, a court cannot make an award
of damages for mental harm unless the harm
consists of a ‘recognised psychiatric
illness’.144 Whilst this might mean that
damages for certain forms of mental harm,
such as loss of self-esteem, would not be
recoverable, children with special needs
could claim relief for recognised illnesses
such as depression and anxiety.
Loss of Chance
Another type of harm that might be alleged
by children with special needs who have not
been adequately supported at school is loss
of chance. This could be particularised as
loss of a chance of economically productive
employment, loss of a chance of better
employment, or loss of some other specific
opportunity based on the facts of the case.
Brennan J of the High Court said in Sellars
v Adelaide Petroleum NL:
‘Provided an opportunity offers a
substantial, and not merely speculative,
prospect of acquiring a benefit that the
plaintiff sought to acquire or of
avoiding a detriment that the plaintiff
sought to avoid, the opportunity can be
held to be valuable.’145
However, the High Court has noted the
difficulties with establishing loss of a chance
as actionable damage, The court has said
that in order for damage to be established,
the court must be capable of determining
the position the plaintiff would have been in
but for the negligent act.146 In some cases,
expert evidence can assist in establishing
this.147
Loss of promised opportunity is recognised
as actionable damage in contract cases,
regardless of the fact that some speculation
is required,148 and Australian courts have
compensated claimants for loss of a chance
in other matters, such as cases involving the
loss of a chance to recover on a cause of
action due to deficient legal advice.149 The
Australian High Court has confirmed that,
in some cases, a loss of economic chance
140 Skipper v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council [2006] EWCA Civ 238, [2006] ELR 322.
141 Oyston v St Patrick’s College [2011] NSWSC 269; Cox v State of New South Wales [2007] NSWSC 471. See also
Annetts v Australian Stations Pty Ltd (2002) 211 CLR 317.
142 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 34(1); Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 32(1); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA),
s 33(1); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 34(1); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 72(1); Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5S(1).
143 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 34(4); Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 32(4); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA),
s 33(4); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 34(4); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 72(4); Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5S(4).
144 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 35; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 31; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 53;
Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 33; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 75.
145 Brennan J in Sellars v Adelaide Petroleum NL (1994) 179 CLR 332, 364.
146 Tabet v Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537, 557.
147 See Phelps v London Borough of Hillingdon; Anderton and Clwyd County Council [2001] 2 AC 619, 656 (Lord
Slynn). In Australia, the example has been given of a medical negligence case, where it might be established that if a
cancer had been found earlier, it would not have metastasised; Tabet v Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537 per Gummow ACJ,
557.
148 See Chaplin v Hicks [1911] 2 KB 786.
149 Johnson v Perez (1988) 166 CLR 351; Sellars v Adelaide Petroleum NL (1994) 179 CLR 332. Most recently, see Rosa
v Galbally and O’Bryan [2013] VSCA 116.
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will satisfy the requirement of damage.150
Also, the possibility of applying the loss of
chance principle to cases involving negligent
medical diagnosis or treatment has been left
open by the NSW Court of Appeal, that is,
where there is loss of a chance of recovery
or treatment.151
Having said this, the court has expressed
some trepidation in accepting loss of chance
as actionable damage in tort. It has been
said that treating loss of chance as damage
represents an acceptance that something less
than proof of injury is required for
negligence to be made out.152 Also, it has
been noted that a loss of chance may not, in
fact, result in injury. One example of this
occurred in Gregg v Scott153 where a cancer
sufferer argued loss of a chance of a better
medical outcome believing his illness was
terminal, but in fact he survived. On this
basis, it was concluded that it would require
‘strong policy considerations to alter the
present requirement’ of proof of actual
damage.154
Conclusion
There are two main barriers to establishing
actionable negligence in circumstances where
a child with special needs has not been
provided with special educational services.
First, Australian courts and legislators have
demonstrated a general reluctance to impose
a duty of care on public authorities due to
the complexities associated with budget
allocations. Secondly, actionable damage is
harder to find in cases where there is no
clearly identifiable personal injury.
Yet, the conclusion of this analysis is that
the existence of a duty of care on the part of
education departments to ensure that
children with special needs receive adequate
special education support may be arguable
in Australia. It may be open to a court to
conclude that education departments have a
duty to protect children with special needs
from harm, and that this duty is breached if
special education services are not provided.
The damage that results might include
economic loss, ‘mental harm’ if this amounts
to a recognised psychiatric illness, and
possibly loss of chance. Civil liability
legislation does present some additional
challenges for plaintiffs seeking relief,
particularly because the Acts render the
allocation of resources to government
programmes virtually unreviewable, however
it has been shown that these provisions may
not preclude the possibility of relief
altogether.
The significance of this inquiry is that, for
Australian children with special needs who
do not receive special education services,
there is no alternative remedy available.
Most Australian jurisdictions do not provide
a complaints process for children and
parents in relation to the provision of
special education services. Children might be
able to frame their claim as a discrimination
matter in some cases, but this is often
something of a legal fiction since most
children with special needs are met with a
surprising amount of goodwill in schools
and the education system.155 The problem is
generally one of resources, and the way
resources are allocated amongst schools and
children in need of support.
Hayes argued in 1984 that the courts were
not the best forum in which to have debates
about educational quality, particularly as
regards special education.156 This is still
true. However, the courts have not hesitated
to find teachers, schools and education
authorities liable for personal injury on
school grounds. Jerry argues that to fail to
recognise a duty to provide an appropriate
150 Johnson v Perez (1988) 166 CLR 351, 366.
151 Public Trustee as Administrator of the Estate of the Late Peter Saroukas v Sutherland Shire Council [1992] NSWCA
192, 10.
152 Tabet v Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537, per Gummow ACJ at 557; per Kiefel J at 587.
153 Op cit n 136, per Kiefel J at 583–584. See further the article referred to by Kiefel J: L Khoury, ‘Causation and risk in
the highest courts of Canada, England and France’ (2008) 124 Law Quarterly Review 103.
154 Kiefel J in Tabet v Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537, 589.
155 Walsh, op cit n 9.
156 R Hayes, ‘Legal rights and wrongs of special education’ (1984) 8(2) Australian Journal of Special Education 18, 22.
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or effective education draws an arbitrary
distinction between ‘supervision’ and
‘instruction’.157
This article has not advanced a position in
favour of broad ‘educational malpractice’
suits in Australia.158 Rather, it has been
argued that a limited duty directed at
children who can only be effectively
educated if they are provided with special
education services should be recognised.
Children with special needs are particularly
vulnerable in a mainstream education
context. Their parents entrust them to
education departments with the expectation
that they will acquire skills to the extent of
their abilities. For some children, their
disability will provide no barrier to
educational success, as long as reasonable
adjustments are made to their environment.
Providing these children with appropriate
support benefits not only those children, but
also their classmates, as the teacher’s time
can be more evenly distributed.
A failure to provide students whose needs
have been assessed, identified and
documented with the special education
services they require may well constitute
negligence. If children with special needs are
legally required to attend school, then there
must be a duty recognised on the part of the
education departments to enable them to be
educated there.
157 Jerry, op cit n 31, 208.
158 The closest Australian case to an ‘educational malpractice’ type suit was brought against an independent school in
contract: Weir v Geelong Grammar School [2012] VCAT 1736. The plaintiff and her mother argued that they incurred
economic loss because the plaintiff’s education was inadequate to enable her to get into Sydney Law School. The case
could never succeed because there was evidence that the school had gone to considerable lengths to support the plaintiff
educationally and personally. The tribunal said (at [150]) ‘the allegation of Jane and Rose that Rose failed because of
the School would appear to be an outrageous turning of the tables – to allege that a school is obliged to cause the
student to achieve a result, as distinct from providing the student with the opportunity and resources to attempt to
achieve a result’. Note, however, that some other cases have settled out of court: see Mui Kim Teh, ‘Educational
negligence: Comparative cases and trends’ [2013] Ed Law 200, at 208.
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